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In the past, the Government has warned residents in southeastern Queensland that unblocking the Brisbane River would result in a catastrophic flood on Thursday 13 January in Brisbane and Ipswich as well as peak flows in the Lockyer Creek and other regions. The rest is history, and although the flood did not hit 1974, the devastation was severe in both cities. The Queensland Floods Commission was set up by the government next week, among other matters, to report on modelling of flood and warning systems, operating manuals and management of Wivenhoe Dams and other flood mitigation measures. The Commission concluded that the castles were handled in breach of the manual, and one of its 172 recommendations, on 8 and 9 January, was for three of the four authorised flood engineers and their oral testimony to examine the documents generated by the Commission for Crime and Misconduct. Clearly, in the last decade, water engineers in south-eastern Queensland have acquired infrastructure management skills in both climatic regions. They have gained know-how in managing water reductions throughout the region and have advised the government on future water safety measures if drought continues. To accomplish this, they devised and used a variety of methods for precipitation and water utilisation. A rush of possibilities ” Water supply management in Southeast Queensland is an in-depth case study carried out in new and fast changing settings over the last 10 years by engineers. During extremes of the weather, they had to managed their own time, prioritise and learn how to operate water supply systems and flood mitigation systems: first, during long-term drought in the region between 2001 and 2009, when the combined storage of the three major dams in the area fell to under 17 percent; and then during the summer of 2010-2011, when precipitation fell. Following the 1974 Brisbane flood, the Queensland government built the largest dam in the system: Wivenhoe. This dam was constructed to improve the city’s water supply and protect it from floods. It has a total water supply chamber of 1165 000 ML and another 1420 000 ML for its Mitigation Chamber (i.e. its top-up capacity). The total dam capacity is thus 2 585 000 ML. The flood mitigation compartment should then temporarily retain and discharge water from the Brisbane River, reducing floods in Brisbane and Ipswich downstream. The management of the dam is required by Queensland law in order to avoid harm caused by water discharges from the dam. Because the Brisbane Basin is around 50% lower than Their proposal would then include recommendations from government and water supply organisations on water conservation methods. Moreover, the decreasing water levels and the vast expanses of land created because of the decrease of the water levels in Wivenhoe and other dams would have been tackled. By the end of 2010, the system was moved to the opposite end to prevent floods from water supply. The Wivenhoe operators had to handle a system that had reached catastrophic levels in the first week of January 2011. The President of the Australian Public Works Engineering Institute, John Truman, underlined the lessons learned from the many flood catastrophes during the 2010-2011 summer: There will be many lessons and new data on the extent of these disasters. The lessons will include both the local areas in question and the broader engineering profession, which will need adjustments in norms and laws. The management of the Wivenhoe Dam during floods in southern Queensland shows the essential necessity for proper workplace information. The dam can only be used to mitigate flooding via the Wivenhoe Dam, not to prevent it. In 2010 the main weather patterns shifted from El Nio to La Nia, leading to greater precipitation and record precipitation. In April 2009 Wivenhoe Dam reached 40% and water restrictions were removed. But on 4 October 2010, many local residents believed that the drought ended with a 100% dam and first opened the flood floodgates since 2001. By December 2010, the dam had reached 102 percent and the river was inundated with record-breaking rain all month long. On 5 January 2011, Wivenhoe Dam Engineering Officer Graham Keegan informed Wedenhoe Dam operators at 12:26 p.m. It is labelled ‘Severe Weather Warning Bureau (BOM),’ which warns that there may be significant precipitation in the next several days of between 100 and 200 millimetres’ and that the Somerset and Wivenhoe dams are still higher than the others (full level of supply). If the BOM predictions are accurate, floods will probably occur in the near future as long as the catchments stay damp. Please be ready. We will keep you updated as this event develops.
The water levels were reduced and therefore the capacity for flood storage reduced, rather than clearing the floodplain of the dam after severe rains on 9-10 January 2011. This delay necessitated the release of emergency water if the dams, which threatened their stability, had dangerously high levels on 11 January.The different options are analysed. In general, advisory is good option; but when is consultation restricted and who decides, For instance, in October 2010, the Meteorological Bureau said that former Queensland water minister Stephen Robertson in the following rainy season was ‘unusually severe.’ The Manager of the water grid, who was not directly responsible for dam management but was not accountable at the government organisation for flood mitigation and dam security, consulted him. In March 2012, the Flood Commission published its conclusions including a recommendation by the Commission on the behaviour of the dam operators (CMC).

In August 2012, the CMC determined that the engineers in issue acted adversely.

In addition, sections of the dam OS were determined to be contradictory and exhibit no evidence of engineering misconduct. This shows the essential necessity for clear, consistent and correct information about the workplace, as it enables both workers and the management to make a decision.