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A Pacemaker’s Information Leads to an Arrest MIS A fire started out at Ross Compton’s home in Middletown, Ohio, on September 19, 2016. Compton reported to authorities that he awoke to find his house on fire. Before fleeing his home, Compton packed some of his clothes and other possessions in a bag, according to authorities. Anything that didn’t fit in his suitcase he put in additional bags. He also brought his PC and the pacemaker charger. (A pacemaker is a tiny device that is implanted in the chest or belly to assist in the control of irregular cardiac rhythms.) He then smashed a window with his cane and threw his suitcase and belongings out. The fire ended up costing $400,000 in damages. Fire investigators established that the fire started in various places around the house, leading them to believe that it was started by arson. Furthermore, detectives stated that Compton’s house smelled like gasoline and that his narrative of what transpired was incongruous with the evidence. Investigators had to prove arson and insurance fraud. They discovered they had a technique to verify how hard Compton was working and for how long before he escaped the fire: Compton’s pacemaker. Police sought a search warrant for the data stored on Compton’s pacemaker after learning about it. They expected the data to disclose his heart rate and cardiac rhythms prior to, during, and after the fire. The data was downloaded from the device by medical technicians—the same data that would normally be acquired from a pacemaker during an appointment with a physician. The records were then subpoenaed by law enforcement. The statistics did not support Compton’s narrative of what happened that night. The data, according to authorities, showed that Compton was awake when he claimed to be asleep. Furthermore, a cardiologist reviewed the data and concluded that Compton’s medical condition made it unlikely that he would have been able to collect, pack, and remove numerous large and heavy items from the house, exit his bedroom window, and carry the items to the front of his residence in the time that Compton had indicated to authorities. A Butler County, Ohio, grand jury indicted Compton in late January 2017 on felony counts of aggravated arson and insurance fraud for allegedly igniting the fire. The next month, Compton pleaded not guilty to the accusations. Compton’s defence attorney filed a move to suppress the pacemaker data evidence, arguing that it was an arbitrary seizure of his private information. Prosecutors contended that police have traditionally gotten personal information through search warrants and that doing so for a pacemaker should not be handled differently. Law enforcement, for example, can use legally obtained blood samples and medical data as evidence. Investigators have recently used data from other smart devices, such as activity tracker steps and smart speaker questions, to determine how a crime was committed. In Connecticut, for example, Richard Dabate was charged with murdering his wife after police developed a case around the victim’s Fitbit data. (See Chapter 8 for an example.) Despite Compton’s attorney’s objections, Butler County Judge Charles Pater ruled that data from Compton’s pacemaker could be used against him in his impending trial. Compton had been free on his own recognisance since his indictment, but because he failed to attend for a pre-trial hearing in Butler County Common Pleas Court, Judge Charles Pater revoked his bond. Compton was arrested again in late July 2018. This was the first time cops got a search warrant for a pacemaker. Should the gadget that keeps a person alive be allowed to implicate him in a crime if he is dependent on an integrated medical device? After all, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits citizens from being forced to testify against themselves. When Ross Compton had a pacemaker implanted, he had a fundamental right to remain silent. However, the electronic data recorded in his pacemaker led to his arrest and subsequent indictment on arson and insurance fraud charges. In Compton’s instance, the data came from a gadget inside his body rather than a device at home or on his watch. A Butler County judge determined in March 2019 that accessing pacemaker data was not stealing personal information. That is, data are not deemed more secure or private because of their personal character or location. Ross Compton’s pacemaker finally led to his arrest and subsequent indictment on arson and insurance fraud charges. In Compton’s instance, the data came from a device inside his body rather than one in his home or on his wrist. A Butler County judge determined in March 2019 that accessing pacemaker data was not stealing personal information. That is, data are not deemed more secure or private because of their personal character or where they are generated or stored. The defence attorneys have filed an appeal with the 12th District Court of Appeals against the judge’s ruling. Compton’s new trial date has not been determined. The more connected, convenient, and clever our technologies become, the more likely they are to reveal the truth. Consumers employing tracking and recording devices is nothing new. Every day, we all leave illuminating data trails—what prosecutors call “data exhaust”—and prosecutors are recognising how valuable these data may be in solving crimes. Furthermore, new data sources emerge on a regular basis. Autonomous (self-driving) cars, for example, may record our speed, distance travelled, and places. Homes can detect whether rooms are occupied, and smart equipment like refrigerators can monitor our everyday activities. Notably, all of these different sorts of data can be used as evidence in court. These technologies usher in a new era of criminal prosecution and law enforcement. In an age when consumers are continually disclosing personal information, privacy may be a thing of the past. The Compton case may have been one of the first Internet of Things (see Chapter 8) prosecutions, but it will most certainly not be the last. Since Compton’s arrest, two homielde investigations in Ohio have employed similar data. If other courts follow Judge Pater’s finding on the admissibility of Compton’s pacemaker data, consumers may have to realise that utilising smart devices may cause them to lose what little privacy they have left.Take a look at the first example in Chapter 5: An arrest is made as a result of data from a pacemaker. Consider the case’s consequences and respond to the following questions. Do not copy and paste the questions into the window; this should be a free-flowing response, not a Q&A session. Provide entire responses before responding to two peers with content. – Should data from health monitoring/maintenance be used in this situation? If so, why or why not? – What about Ancestry.com or other family history data repositories? Should familial DNA be permitted to be used in court? That is, the data about a relative match is willingly provided to the database by a person. When a crime with DNA has been presented for a match, that database offers law enforcement with the familial links to that DNA. The suspected culprit was not a client of the database firm. For example, suppose I committed a crime (which I did not; this is just an example!) and my biological sister participated in a geneology match with a firm like ’23 And Me.’ When the DNA from the crime site was compared to the DNA in the database, it was determined that a sibling (possibly a sister) of my biological sister committed the crime or was present at the scene. Law enforcement might contact her or simply conduct some research and discover that I am her only biological sibling (which we are well aware of) and the cops show up at my door. Is that correct? I never provided my DNA…(again, this is just an example; I did not commit a crime!). – Take a look at the COVID-19 world in which we all live. On a voluntary basis, ‘contact tracing’ is accessible, and some firms provide data on how’social’ we are based on the location of our phone. (NOTE: Even when GPS is switched off, a tiny amount of data is gathered when you use a phone in close proximity to a cell tower so that they can properly bill your usage.) Is it appropriate for them to collect data about where we travel and who we interact with?
Opening Pacemaker Case Data Leads to an Arrest MIS A fire broke out at Ross Compton’s home in Middletown, Ohio, on September 19, 2016. Compton reported to authorities that he awoke to find his house on fire. Before fleeing his home, Compton packed some of his clothes and other possessions in a bag, according to authorities. Anything that didn’t fit in his suitcase he put in additional bags. He also brought his PC and the pacemaker charger. (A pacemaker is a tiny device that is implanted in the chest or belly to assist in the control of irregular cardiac rhythms.) He then smashed a window with his cane and threw his suitcase and belongings out. The blase resulted in $400,000 in damage. Fire investigators established that the fire started in various places around the house, leading them to believe that it was started by arson. Furthermore, detectives stated that Compton’s house smelled like gasoline and that his narrative of what transpired was incongruous with the evidence. Investigators had to prove arson and insurance fraud. They discovered they had a technique to verify how hard Compton was working and for how long before he escaped the fire: Compton’s pacemaker. Police sought a search warrant for the data stored on Compton’s pacemaker after learning about it. They expected the data to disclose his heart rate and cardinal rhythms before, during, and after the procedure.