State of Connecticut v. Cardwell 718 A.2d 954 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1998) The State of Connecticut brought suit against Roderick Cardwell, a resident of Connecticut and the owner of Ticketworld, contending that he was engaged in “ticket scalping” in violation of Connecticut law. A Connecticut statute makes it an unfair or deceptive trade practice to sell tickets to sporting and entertainment events to be held in Connecticut to purchasers located in Connecticut, for a price more than $3 in excess of the price, including tax, printed on the face of the ticket, or fixed for admission. Cardwell was engaged in the business of selling tickets to entertainment and sporting events to be held in Connecticut. Ticketworld operated from two locations, one in Hartford and one in Springfield, Massachusetts. In order to obtain business, Ticketworld advertised in newspapers, including newspapers that circulate in Connecticut. The advertisements that appeared in Connecticut newspapers instructed prospective purchasers to telephone the Hartford office of Ticketworld for tickets to events that would take place outside of Connecticut and to telephone the Springfield office for tickets to events that would be held in Connecticut. In the event that a prospective customer telephoned the Hartford office for tickets to a Connecticut event, the prospective customer was instructed to telephone the Springfield office in order to purchase those tickets. On many occasions, Ticketworld sold tickets to Connecticut events from its Springfield office, for which it charged a price that exceeded the fixed price of the ticket, tax included, by more than $3. The trial court found, specifically, that Ticketworld (1) had charged Mary Lou Lupovitch $125 per ticket for tickets to an event at the Connecticut Tennis Court in New Haven, although those tickets had a fixed price of $32.50 per ticket, and (2) had charged Cyrilla Bergeron $137 per ticket for tickets to an event in Hartford, although those tickets had a fixed price of $53.50 per ticket. The court determined that Ticketworld, in selling these tickets for a price in excess of the fixed price for admission, had violated section 53-289. Consequently, it issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Cardwell from engaging in any activity within the state in connection with selling, offering for sale, attempting to sell, mailing or otherwise delivering, or advertising or promoting the sale of any ticket to an event
attempting to sell, mailing or otherwise delivering, or advertising or promoting the sale of any ticket to an event to be held in Connecticut sold for a price more than $3 in excess of the fixed price of the ticket, including tax. Cardwell appealed, contending that because he sold tickets to events in Connecticut only through Ticketworld’s office in Springfield, Massachusetts, the sales” did not take place in Connecticut and thus did not violate Connecticut law. Berdon, Associate Justice In Connecticut, the sale of goods is governed by the Connecticut Uniform Commercial Code—Sales (code). Under the code, a “sale” is defined as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price….” Section 2–106(1). The code further provides that “[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller Page 569 completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place….†Section 2–401(2). In addition, the code provides that if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment….” Section 2–401(2)(a). The latter provision reflects the distinction made by the code between “shipment” and “destination” contracts. Under the code, when a carrier is used to transport the goods sold, shipment contracts and destination contracts are the only two types of sales contracts recognized. Section 2–401(2). Furthermore, under the code, “[t]he shipment contract is regarded as the (general rule].†Under a shipment contract, the seller is either required or authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but is not required to deliver them at a particular destination, and delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer. Section 2–401(2)(a). Under a destination contract, the seller is required to deliver the goods to the buyer at the named destination and delivery occurs upon tender of the goods at that destination. A strong presumption against the creation of destination contracts is contained in the code such that, in the absence of specific proof of agreement by the seller to deliver the goods to a particular destination and to bear the attendant risk of loss until such delivery, a sales contract that merely provides that the goods will be shipped to a certain location will be deemed to be a shipment contract.
to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment….” Section 2–401(2)(a). The latter provision reflects the distinction made by the code between “shipment” and “destination†contracts. Under the code, when a carrier is used to transport the goods sold, shipment contracts and destination contracts are the only two types of sales contracts recognized. Section 2–401(2). Furthermore, under the code, “[t]he shipment contract is regarded as the [general rule].” Under a shipment contract, the seller is either required or authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but is not required to deliver them at a particular destination, and delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer. Section 2–401(2)(a). Under a destination contract, the seller is required to deliver the goods to the buyer at the named destination and delivery occurs upon tender of the goods at that destination. A strong presumption against the creation of destination contracts is contained in the code such that, in the absence of specific proof of agreement by the seller to deliver the goods to a particular destination and to bear the attendant risk of loss until such delivery, a sales contract that merely provides that the goods will be shipped to a certain location will be deemed to be a shipment contract. In this case, the contracts made by Cardwell for the sale of tickets do not contain any explicit agreement by Cardwell to deliver the goods to a particular destination or to bear the attendant risk of loss until such time as the goods are delivered. Therefore, the contracts at issue in this case are properly classified as shipment contracts. Because delivery of the goods to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer under a shipment contract, section 2–401(2)(a), with respect to each sale of tickets made by Cardwell, delivery is made to the post office or other commercial carrier, and hence to the buyer, within Massachusetts. As a result, the “sale” of the tickets, as defined by the code, occurs in Massachusetts. Consequently, the trial court’s determination that Cardwell sells tickets within Connecticut, and thereby violates the Connecticut statute, was incorrect. Judgment reversed in favor of Cardwell.
attempting to sell, mailing or otherwise delivering, or advertising or promoting the sale of any ticket to an event to be held in Connecticut sold for a price more than $3 in excess of the fixed price of the ticket, including tax. Cardwell appealed, contending that because he sold tickets to events in Connecticut only through Ticketworld’s office in Springfield, Massachusetts, the sales” did not take place in Connecticut and thus did not violate Connecticut law. Berdon, Associate Justice In Connecticut, the sale of goods is governed by the Connecticut Uniform Commercial Code—Sales (code). Under the code, a “sale” is defined as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price….” Section 2–106(1). The code further provides that “[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller Page 569 completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place….†Section 2–401(2). In addition, the code provides that if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment….” Section 2–401(2)(a). The latter provision reflects the distinction made by the code between “shipment” and “destination” contracts. Under the code, when a carrier is used to transport the goods sold, shipment contracts and destination contracts are the only two types of sales contracts recognized. Section 2–401(2). Furthermore, under the code, “[t]he shipment contract is regarded as the (general rule].†Under a shipment contract, the seller is either required or authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but is not required to deliver them at a particular destination, and delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer. Section 2–401(2)(a). Under a destination contract, the seller is required to deliver the goods to the buyer at the named destination and delivery occurs upon tender of the goods at that destination. A strong presumption against the creation of destination contracts is contained in the code such that, in the absence of specific proof of agreement by the seller to deliver the goods to a particular destination and to bear the attendant risk of loss until such delivery, a sales contract that merely provides that the goods will be shipped to a certain location will be deemed to be a shipment contract.
to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment….” Section 2–401(2)(a). The latter provision reflects the distinction made by the code between “shipment” and “destination†contracts. Under the code, when a carrier is used to transport the goods sold, shipment contracts and destination contracts are the only two types of sales contracts recognized. Section 2–401(2). Furthermore, under the code, “[t]he shipment contract is regarded as the [general rule].” Under a shipment contract, the seller is either required or authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but is not required to deliver them at a particular destination, and delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer. Section 2–401(2)(a). Under a destination contract, the seller is required to deliver the goods to the buyer at the named destination and delivery occurs upon tender of the goods at that destination. A strong presumption against the creation of destination contracts is contained in the code such that, in the absence of specific proof of agreement by the seller to deliver the goods to a particular destination and to bear the attendant risk of loss until such delivery, a sales contract that merely provides that the goods will be shipped to a certain location will be deemed to be a shipment contract. In this case, the contracts made by Cardwell for the sale of tickets do not contain any explicit agreement by Cardwell to deliver the goods to a particular destination or to bear the attendant risk of loss until such time as the goods are delivered. Therefore, the contracts at issue in this case are properly classified as shipment contracts. Because delivery of the goods to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer under a shipment contract, section 2–401(2)(a), with respect to each sale of tickets made by Cardwell, delivery is made to the post office or other commercial carrier, and hence to the buyer, within Massachusetts. As a result, the “sale” of the tickets, as defined by the code, occurs in Massachusetts. Consequently, the trial court’s determination that Cardwell sells tickets within Connecticut, and thereby violates the Connecticut statute, was incorrect. Judgment reversed in favor of Cardwell.
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